The increasing diversification and intensity of human activities in coastal zones can be correlated with increasing differentiation in societal, economic, political and administrative systems. With increasing differentiation activities and actors become compartmentalised. As a result capacity for governance, in terms of knowledge, tools and factors that facilitate action, becomes dispersed. With coastal ecosystems dynamically linked, and human activities frequently linked either directly or indirectly, impacts and issues often cross the artificial boundaries of a differentiated socio-political system. These transboundary issues force recognition of interdependency, which requires integration and co-ordination of differentiated elements to restrain increasing entropy in the system.

  This has been recognised in the development of frameworks for integrating ecosystem governance, such as Integrated Coastal Management (ICM). These frameworks have highlighted the need for integration in several dimensions, especially the need for vertical and horizontal integration of state policies and interventions. Transparency in government, and the role of stakeholder participation in planning and management have also been promoted frequently, especially with regard to civil society organisations and communities. By contrast, both Morocco and Tunisia have highly compartmentalised, centralised bureaucratic state structures. Local government, administrative decentralisation, civil society and stakeholder consultation are all limited, and decision-making processes are opaque.

  This paper investigates how institutional arrangements in three dimensions - cross-sectoral, vertical and state-society - effect coastal governance in Morocco and Tunisia. Using Kooiman's socio-political theory of governance as an analytical framework (Kooiman, 1993; 1999; 2000), 90 interviews at three study sites were conducted with government officials, resource users, NGOs, scientists, businesses and politicians. Their interactions were analysed in terms of both the action level, and the social, cultural, and material structures and contexts within which interactions occur.

  Aspects of the sites investigated included the extraction and conservation of fresh water resources, management of artisinal fisheries, coastal agriculture, marine pollution, public health, wetland conservation, tourism and recreational management, urban development, and community development. The analysis revealed general similarities across all three dimensions at all three sites.

  Horizontal, cross-sectoral integration appears strong. Regional technical committees meet regularly to co-ordinate activities and share information. Plans d'amenagement spatially integrate socio-economic development and the environment. However, cross-sectoral integration is weakened by inter-service rivalry, a lack of engagement, 'committee weariness', and constraints on regional joint plans and programmes imposed by the centre. Plans often do not analytically integrate programmes or policies, but spatially delineate the activities of each department. Even integrated regional plans are subject to interference from centrally derived projects.

  Clear lines of accountability and command, and close supervision of subordinates make vertical integration also appear strong on paper. However, communication is weakened by resource constraints and problems associated with the hierarchical nature of command. Information trickles up and orders flow down, frequently without explanation. Local and regional offices have little decision-making authority, with decisions and budgets subject to approval at higher levels of the hierarchy. This burden on central offices creates bottlenecks in flows of information and other resources, slowing response times and flexibility for adaptive management. Inflexible multi-year plans, drafted by technical experts, become the basis for action by managers.

   Similar concerns with centralised control exist in interactions between state and society. Civil organisations are constrained in their activities, rarely independent, and generally denied access to decision-making forums. No grassroots groups were encountered, nor did officials see them as being necessary or useful. The technocratic approach to resource management, denaturing the social context of problems, has resulted in a regime of instrumental action that generally addresses symptoms rather than causes of resource degradation. Yet a lack of alternative structures for participation in governance and a lack of sanction for community based action have left many user groups dependent upon under-resourced state structures. This was particularly the case for small-scale fishers and farmers.

  The central problem identified in both countries was that in maintaining under-resourced command and control systems the central governments have undermined their own capacities to deal with complex, dynamic and diverse sets of governance problems. This is generating economic, social, environmental and political costs that are likely to be unsustainable. Poor information sharing, a lack of integrated analysis, and a reliance on instrumental action that discourages stakeholder participation in governance have led to conflicts in programmes and policies, cumulative impact on resources, and questioning of the state's efficiency and legitimacy. Many constraints on action were identified, most obviously resource constraints, but also critical technical, authority and political constraints acting on officials, whilst most resource users and civil society organisations were operating under economic, opportunity and authority constraints. A relaxation of controls and restrictions on local officials, local councils, civil society organisations and community groups should accompany any measures to increase administrative co-ordination, efficiency and performance.

  The evidence from this study suggests that rigid government structures of a top-down, command and control nature are incapable of governing the complex dynamics of coastal zones. For such a regime to be successful would require an implausible level of resourcing in terms of labour, capital and authority. Although a normative conclusion to reach, the evidence here suggests that shifting to a pluralistic governance structure is necessary for sustainable coastal governance.

The research presented in this paper was conducted within the framework of the MECO Project, an international multidisciplinary consortium of university and government partners engaged in coastal research in the Mediterranean. It was funded under the International Co-operation (INCO) funding stream of Directorate General XII (DG XII) of the European Commission, research contract number ERB IC18-CT98-0270. The INCO funding stream facilitates co-operation in research between institutions from the European Union and the rest of the world.